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Congress's power to establish independent regulatory commissions has
seemed clear at least since the Supreme Court decided Humphrey's Execu-
tor v. United States' in 1935. Recently, however, both the necessity and
constitutional legitimacy of commissions that are independent of presiden-
tial direction have been subjected to renewed discussion.' Congress's
attempt to check abuses of executive power by creating "executive" agen-
cies outside of presidential control has been challenged by some commen-
tators as a violation of the separation of powers.'
This Article takes issue with the blanket assertion that independent reg-
ulatory commissions are unconstitutional. It contends that the Founding
t General Counsel, Federal Election Commission.
t" Special Assistant General Counsel, Federal Election Commission.
The opinions in this Article are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the Federal
Election Commission.
1. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
2. See, e.g., Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the
Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984) (independent agencies unconstitutional except to
insulate decisions from political pressure). The constitutional parameters of Congress's power to ex-
empt agencies from executive control have generally been tested through assertion of the President's
removal power. While the authors believe that the independence of the FEC from both presidential
and congressional control is consistent with Professor Strauss's thesis, we have used the traditional
meaning of "independent agency" as one whose decisions are insulated from direct political pressure
by a legislative shield against removal by the President. We do not claim that this is the only shield
that defines agency "independence." See also Note, In Defense of Administrative Autonomy, 96 YALE
L.J. 787 (1987); Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 Sup. CT. REV. 41; Note, Incorporation of
Independent Agencies Into the Executive Branch, 94 YALE L.J. 1766 (1985); Tiefer, The Constitu-
tionality of Independent Officers as Checks on Abuses of Executive Power, 63 B.U.L. REV, 59 (1983);
Note, Fallen Angels, Separation of Powers, and the Saturday Night Massacre: An Examination of
the Practical, Constitutional, and Political Tensions in the Special Prosecutor Provisions of the
Ethics in Government Act, 49 BROOKLYN L. REV. 113 (1982) [hereinafter Note, Fallen Angels];
Ledewitz, The Uncertain Power of the President to Execute the Laws, 46 TENN. L. REV. 757 (1979);
Note, The Proposed Court-Appointed Special Prosecutor: In Quest of a Constitutional justification,
87 YAILE L.J. 1692 (1978); Note, Removing Politics From the Justice Department: Constitutional
Problems with Institutional Reform, 50 N.Y.U. L. REV. 366 (1975) [hereinafter Note, Removing
Politics].
3. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 2; Tiefer, supra note 2; Ledewitz, supra note 2; Note, Remov-
ing Politics, supra note 2.
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Fathers made the Constitution flexible enough to meet administrative exi-
gencies and did not intend to leave the enforcement of all laws to the
President, and argues further that courts reviewing the allocation of
"executive" power should be guided by Congress's power under the neces-
sary and proper clause to insulate sensitive decisions from presidential
control.
The example of the Federal Election Commission ("FEC" or "Com-
mission") is used throughout the Article to illustrate this thesis. The FEC,
because of its sensitive role in the electoral process, is a particularly apt
example of an agency whose executive decisions should remain free from
direct presidential or congressional supervision. The FEC is a profitable
example because, unlike other administrative agencies, its constitutionality
is subject to expedited litigative attack under special provisions of the Fed-
eral Election Campaign Act4 which allow parties to seek the certification
of constitutional issues to the Courts of Appeals and the Supreme Court.6
Political candidates and others claiming injury from FEC review of cam-
paign finance regulation have direct standing to sue the Commission.
Indeed, the constitutionality of the FEC has already been litigated before
the Supreme Court, most notably in Buckley v. Valeo.6
By showing that the FEC is constitutional under the necessary and
proper clause, this Article demonstrates that any blanket argument
rejecting the constitutionality of all independent agencies is inadequate,
and that the necessary and proper clause is an avenue for case-by-case
adjudication of the constitutional question. Part I outlines the judicial his-
tory of independent agencies. Part II explores Congress's intent in estab-
lishing the FEC in the context of the necessary and proper clause. Part
III considers the test of the FEC's constitutionality in Buckley v. Valeo,
and Congress's subsequent reconstitution of the agency. Offering prag-
matic and constitutional arguments, this Part articulates the consistency
between Buckley and other litigation on independent agencies. Finally, the
Article concludes that the Supreme Court should explicitly embrace the
4. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1971) (codified as
amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (1982)). The 1974 FECA amendments provided for the creation of
the Federal Election Commission, an independent regulatory agency, to administer campaign finance
laws. It was empowered to promulgate rules, require the submission of campaign disclosure reports,
conduct investigations, subpoena witnesses, issue advisory opinions, and initiate civil actions or request
that the Attorney General initiate civil or criminal actions to enforce election campaign finance laws.
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (1974)
(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (1982)).
5. 2 U.S.C. § 437h (1982).
6. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 8 n.4 (1976). See also Bread Political Action Committee v.
FEC, 455 U.S. 577, 581 (1982) (only the FEC, a national party committee, or a voter eligible to vote
in a presidential election may invoke the expedited procedures); California Medical Ass'n. v. FEC,
453 U.S. 182, 189 (1981) ($5000 limit on annual contributions by individuals and unincorporated
associations is constitutional).
Vol. 4: 363, 1987
Independent Agencies
necessary and proper clause as a criterion for the examination of the con-
stitutionality of other independent agencies.
I. Independent Agencies: Historical Foundations and Recent Cases
Supreme Court approval of independent agencies goes back more than
fifty years, to Humphrey's Executor v. United States.' The oft-told story
of Humphrey's Executor requires only summary description. President
Franklin D. Roosevelt sought to remove Commissioner William E.
Humphrey from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) because he felt
that the commissioner's views were inconsistent with his own.' The Presi-
dent believed that he should control and direct the Commission's work
himself. The Supreme Court disallowed the President's action on two
grounds: first, because Congress had specified the causes for removal; and
second, because Congress had explicitly created the FTC as an indepen-
dent regulatory commission.9 The Court thus acceded to Congress's intent
to create a body independent of executive authority. 0 The Court's reason-
ing emphasized the need for agency autonomy, observing that "it is quite
evident that one who holds his office only during the pleasure of another,
cannot be depended upon to maintain an attitude of independence against
the latter's will." 1
Recently, in Synar v. United States,'2 the District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia questioned the contemporary validity of Humphrey's
Executor.'s The court in Synar stated in dictum that it was "difficult to
reconcile Humphrey's Executor's 'headless fourth branch' with a constitu-
tional text and tradition establishing three branches of
7. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
8. In August 1933, Roosevelt wrote Humphrey, "I do not feel that your mind and my mind go
along together on either the policies or the administering of the Federal Trade Commission." Id. at
619.
9. Id. at 624.
10. Id. at 625-26. The Court recognized Congress's intent to create "a body which shall be
independent of executive authority, except in its selection, and free to exercise its judgment without
the leave or hindrance of any other official or any department of the government." Id. (emphasis in
original).
11. Id. at 629.
12. 626 F. Supp. 1374 (D.D.C. 1986) (per curiam) (Scalia, Johnson, Gasch, JJ.).
13. The claim before the Synar court was that the automatic deficit reduction process established
by the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985 (the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings
Act) Pub. L. No. 99-177, 99 Stat. 1038, 2 U.S.C.A. §§ 901-922 (West Supp. 1986), under which the
President was required to implement budget reductions specified in a report by the Comptroller Gen-
eral, 2 U.S.C.A. § 902(a)(1) (West Supp. 1986), violated the separation of powers. The court found
that this process vested executive power in the Comptroller General-an officer removable by Con-
gress-and held that congressional removal power cannot extend to an officer who actually partici-
pates in the execution of the laws. 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1403. See Elliott, Regulating the Deficit After
Bowsher v. Synar, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 317 (1987).
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government. ... "4 While the Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's
decision,"5 it stated explicitly that its ruling should not be seen as "casting
doubt on the status of 'independent' agencies,"' 6 and rejected the appel-
lants' claim that affirmance would invalidate the charters and functions of
many independent agencies. The Supreme Court thus accepted, virtually
in toto, the oral argument of the Solicitor General, who dismissed appel-
lants' independent agency argument as a "scare" and asserted that his
own argument did "not in any way cast doubt on independent agencies."'"
Despite the Court's assurances to the contrary, Synar has been viewed
as a potential threat to the constitutional status of independent agencies
14. 626 F. Supp. at 1398. The court remarked that "Justice Sutherland's decision in
Humphrey's Executor . . .is stamped with some of the political science preconceptions characteristic
of its era and not of the present day-if not stamped as well, as President Roosevelt thought, with
hostility towards the architect of the New Deal." Id. Emphasizing the uncertainty which it thought
surrounded the constitutional status of independent agencies, the court remarked that "lilt is not as
obvious today as it seemed in the 1930's that there can be such things as genuinely 'independent'
regulatory agencies." Id.
15. Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986).
16. Id. at 3188 n.4.
17. The following excerpts from the text of the exchange between Solicitor General Fried and
Justice O'Connor are of interest:
Fried: Section 251 [2 U.S.C. § 901) of the 1985 Act gives the Comptroller General responsibil-
ity for the execution of the Act by assigning to him the determination of reductions in outlays
throughout the government.
This grant of authority violates the Constitution, first and principally because the grant is to
an official removable only on the initiative of Congress ...JaInd second, because executive
functions importantly affecting the whole of the executive branch and directing the President
himself may only be performed by an officer who serves at the pleasure of the President.
I would like to say at the outset that this second argument does not in our view in any way
cast doubt on the validity of agencies such as the Federal Reserve Board, the Federal Trade
Commission, or any such agencies, and that the notion that the second argument in some sense
endangers those agencies or would embark this Court on some constitutional misadventure is
simply a scare which we don't intend to throw into the Court and I don't think need be
thrown there.
O'Connor: Well, Mr. Fried, I'll confess you scared me with it. (Laughter) So why don't you
explain.
Fried: Well, the principal point, Justice O'Connor, is that the powers which are given to the
Comptroller General here are so sweeping they affect every nook and cranny of the Executive
Department. They give orders to the President himself. They affect every one of the executive
agencies.
And there is no single agency of those that we are perfectly familiar with which has any
such sweeping powers. And the argument we make is simply that an officer who can have that
pervasive effect on the executive branch must be removable by the President at will.
O'Connor: Well, that strikes me as kind of a novel doctrine you're espousing .... [C]an't it
be said that the Federal Reserve Board, for example, through its powers, basically affects the
financial structure of every agency in government?
Fried: The Federal Reserve Board is a good example, because in fact what the Federal
Reserve Board does is to determine, as the bank which it is established to be, the interest rate
it will charge to its clients. . . .It's quite interesting that the statute setting up the Federal
Reserve Board specifically said that nothing in it shall in any sense impinge on the powers of
the Secretary of the Treasury. Here we have an official who gives orders to the President. I
don't think we have that in respect to the Federal Reserve Board or any of the other agencies
which we're familiar with.
Transcript of oral argument at 51, Bowsher v. Synar, 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986).
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and is but one example of a growing controversy over the role of these
agencies."8 On September 13, 1985, Attorney General Edwin Meese III
argued that "the framers of the Constitution did not intend Federal agen-
cies to be independent of the President or to be run by bureaucrats who
are not politically accountable.""9 He maintained that these agencies
belong in the executive branch under presidential control:
Federal Agencies performing executive functions are themselves
properly agents of the executive. They are not "quasi" this or "inde-
pendent" that. In the tripartite scheme of government, a body with
enforcement powers is part of the executive branch of government.S
Moreover, in Ticor Title Insurance Co. v. Federal Trade Commission,21
a federal district court considered the argument that the delegation of law
enforcement powers to the FTC was unconstitutional because the FTC
was given the exclusive power to initiate enforcement proceedings and was
not subject to the supervisory control of the President. Although the court
"reluctantly" 2 dismissed the case on ripeness grounds, it did question the
reach of Humphrey's Executor:
[Tihere is no doubt that plaintiffs raise a serious and substantial
issue of considerable public importance. The constitutionality of in-
dependent federal agencies has never been fully adjudicated; as the
Assistant Attorney General for the United States candidly admitted,
the issue has been avoided for years."5
Amid such widespread questioning of independent regulatory commis-
sions,"4 it is important to consider the significance of Buckley v.
18. The Synar case generated a flood of commentary and editorials speculating on whether the
demise of independent agencies was imminent. See, e.g., Verkuil, Are Independent Agencies
Doomed?, Wash. Post, Aug. 24, 1986, at C7, col. 1; Fein, Get Rid of Regulatory Agencies, Wash.
Post, Jul. 27, 1986, at D5, col. 4; Status of Independent Agencies Attacked, CONG. Q., Apr. 19,
1986, at 7; Regulatory Antibodies?-The Courts May Cut the Federal Agencies Down To Size, Bar-
ron's, Apr. 14, 1986, at 11; Independent Agencies A Bit Nervous-Constitutionality Of Their Power
To Regulate Being Challenged, Wash. Post, Feb. 13, 1986, at A21, col. 1; Ruling Seen Reaching
Beyond Budget To Affect Debate Over U.S. Agencies, Wall St. J., Feb. 10, 1986, at 12, col. 1; Quasi-
Constitutional Agencies, Wall St. J., Nov. 29, 1985, at 12, col. 1. Indeed, criticism of independent
agencies has become so far-ranging that even a church leader has joined the debate. In an address
entitled "The Constitution-A Heavenly Banner," Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints Pres-
ident Ezra Taft Benson stated that "most of the federal agencies are unconstitutional . . . because
they concentrate the functions of the legislative, executive and judicial branches under one head."
(reprinted in 132 CONG. REC. S13,848, S13,851 (daily ed. Sept. 26, 1986)).
19. See A Question of Power, A Powerful Questioner, N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1985, at B8, col. 3.
20. Id.
21. 625 F. Supp. 747 (D.D.C. 1986).
22. Id. at 752.
23. Id. at 751.
24. Recently a former Reagan Administration official challenged the constitutionality of the
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Valeo 25-a case involving the FEC whose central conclusion is often
ignored by proponents of complete presidential control over executive
agencies. 6 While the Buckley Court held the appointment procedure of
the FEC as then devised unconstitutional, it indicated that Federal Elec-
tion Commissioners could exercise executive powers if they were ap-
pointed by the President and subject to Senate confirmation.27 In
Humphrey's Executor the Court had upheld Congress's power to create
independent agencies if legitimate functional needs justified such a step.2"
In Buckley, it went on to acknowledge the necessity of such a properly
appointed Federal Election Commission. 9 Because of the Commission's
sensitive role in the oversight and possible prosecution of political candi-
dates,"0 including an incumbent President and his opponent, the Court
recognized the need to insulate the Commission from the President.
Therefore, the Court mandated only that Commissioners be appointed
pursuant to article II, section 2 of the Constitution. As a result of Buckley,
the FEC has become the model of a properly constituted independent
agency.
II. The Creation of the FEC
In creating the FEC, Congress determined that an independent agency
was necessary and proper to enforce campaign finance legislation. This
Part first briefly examines the scope of the necessary and proper clause of
the Constitution, and then outlines the legislative history underlying the
creation of the FEC.
independent counsel statute, in connection with the current Iran-Contra controversy. North v. Walsh,
No. 87-457 (D.D.C. filed Feb. 24, 1987). The potential problem was circumvented by appointing the
independent counsel to the Department of Justice. See North's Challenge to Prosecutor Act Dismissed
by Court, N.Y. Times, Mar. 13, 1987, at Al, col. 4; see also Deaver v. Seymour, No. 87-477 (D.D.C.
filed Feb. 25, 1987) (independent counsel alleged unconstitutional in connection with influence-ped-
dling prosecution).
25. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
26. But see Strauss, supra note 2, at 619. Strauss contends that Buckley implies the unconstitu-
tionality of independent agency action except when decisions should be insulated from political pres-
sure. Yet in making this exception he carefully preserves the right to substantive independence. d. at
622-23. Though Strauss does not focus on prosecutorial judgments, nothing in his argument necessa-
rily subjects the FEC's prosecutorial decisions to presidential direction or requires consultation with
any governmental branch before the FEC brings an enforcement action.
27. 424 U.S. at 135-43.
28. 295 U.S. 602, 629. See supra notes 7-10 and accompanying text.
29. 424 U.S. at 143.
30. Congress intended civil enforcement actions to be alternatives of the last resort. See H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 1057, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 45, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 946.
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A. The Scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause
Congress has the power to make all laws which shall be necessary and
proper for carrying into execution its own powers and all other powers
vested by the Constitution in the Government of the United States, or any
department thereof. 1 Since McCulloch v. Maryland,32 it has been horn-
book law that the "vertical" portion of the clause permits Congress discre-
tion both as to when its own powers will be exercised, and as to how they
shall be executed. What is often overlooked is that the second, or "hori-
zontal," portion of the clause allows Congress to determine how all pow-
ers vested in the rest of the federal government, including the executive
branch, shall be executed.8 Thus, the Constitution provides that Congress
may specify the means and manner by which the powers vested in the
federal government or in any department or officer of the federal govern-
ment may be executed, subject only to the limitation that it cannot contra-
vene an express constitutional provision. 4
Congress's power under the necessary and proper clause is broad. In
the famous language of Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch v.
Maryland:
[The necessary and proper clause] . . . allow[s] to the national legis-
lature that discretion, with respect to the means by which the powers
[the Constitution] confers are to be carried into execution, which will
enable that body to perform the high duties assigned to it, in the
manner most beneficial to the people. Let the end be legitimate, let it
be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are
31. U.S. CONST[. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. For an analysis of the scope of the necessary and proper
clause, see Van Alstyne, The Role of Congress in Determining Incidental Powers of the President
and of the Federal Courts: A Comment on the Horizontal Effect of "The Sweeping Clause," 36
OHIO S'[. L.J. 788 (1975). Van Alstyne maintains that the second half of the clause
assigns to Congress alone the responsibility to say by law what additional authority, if any, the
executive and the courts are to have beyond that core of powers that are literally indispensable,
rather than merely appropriate or helpful to the performance of the express duties under
Articles I1 and III of the Constitution.
Id. at 799.
32. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
33. Under the second portion of the necessary and proper clause, for example, Congress has
determined the qualifications for officers of the United States nominated by the President. As Justice
Brandeis pointed out:
(A) multitude of laws have been enacted which limit the President's power to make nomina-
tions, and which, through the restrictions imposed, may prevent the selection of the person
deemed by him best fitted. Such restriction upon the power to nominate has been exercised by
Congress continuously since the foundation of the Government. Every President has approved
one or more of such acts. Every President has consistently observed them. This is true of those
offices to which he makes appointments without the advice and consent of the Senate as well as
those for which consent is required.
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 265 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
34. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 138-39.
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appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not
prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitu-
tion, are constitutional.3 5
In finding that the incorporation of the Bank of the United States was a
necessary and proper means of executing vested congressional powers,"
Chief Justice Marshall emphasized that the clause is not "confined to
those single means, without which the end would be entirely unattaina-
ble."" To the contrary, the clause should be seen as an affirmative power
of Congress "to exercise its best judgment in the selection of measures to
carry into execution the constitutional powers of government.""
An early judicial recognition of the necessary and proper clause justifi-
cation for federal election controls came with Burroughs v. United
States.39 In the spirit of Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in McCulloch,
the Supreme Court found that Congress had the power to protect elections
from interference and held constitutional 40 the Federal Corrupt Practices
Act,41 an antecedent to the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971.42 The
Burroughs Court emphasized the importance of allowing Congress to deal
with serious national problems by appropriate means. The Court stated
that Congress "undoubtedly . . .possesses every . . .power essential to
preserve the departments and institutions of the general government from
impairment or destruction."" The "choice of means" to achieve these
ends, according to the Court, "presents a question primarily addressed to
the judgment of Congress."" As the following legislative history of the
FEC illustrates, forty years after Burroughs Congress judged that an
independent agency was necessary and proper to preserve the integrity of
government operations and public confidence in the electoral process.
B. The Legislative History of the FEC
In 1971, Congress completed a long debate over revisions of federal
campaign finance laws with a major new enactment, the Federal Election
35. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 421.
36. Id. at 424.
37. Id. at 414.
38. Id. at 420.
39. 290 U.S. 534 (1934).
40. Id. at 547.
41. Federal Corrupt Practices Act, ch. 368, tit. 111, 43 Stat. 1070 (1925) (codified as amended at
18 U.S.C. §§ 591, 597, 599 (1982)).
42. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as
amended at 2 U.S.C. § 431-442 (1982). See Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 658 (1884) (govern-
ment "must have power to protect the elections on which its existence depends from violence and
corruption").
43. 290 U.S. at 545.
44. Id. at 547.
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Campaign Act (FECA). As part of that debate, Congress-facing the fact
that campaign finance laws largely had been ignored-considered creating
a specialized administrative agency to administer the Act.45 It was not
until the 1974 amendments to FECA, however, that the FEC was
created.46
The debates preceding the 1974 FECA amendments occurred during
the Watergate controversy, which raised fundamental questions about the
executive branch's responsibility to obey the very laws that it and its of-
ficers had sworn faithfully to execute. The Watergate imbroglio, which
involved the use of personnel and money belonging to President Nixon's
reelection committee, brought to the forefront questions about the Presi-
dent's use of federal agencies under his control against political enemies.
Pressure to create an independent agency was intensified by Congress's
belief that campaign finance laws could not regulate the activities of the
President's own reelection committee unless the execution of those laws
was free from his direct control. Widespread congressional mistrust and
fear of executive power also generated movement for the radical idea, dis-
approved in Buckley,47 that Congress should assert the appointment power
over members of the agency.
Congress's fear that a President might use an agency within his control
to harass or embarrass political opponents appeared justified.48 The final
report of the Senate Watergate Committee discussed in painstaking detail
several "attempts by White House personnel to use Government agencies
for their own political ends." '49
45. Though independence was contemplated in the original 1971 legislation, the FEC became an
independent agency for the first time under the 1974 FECA amendments. In the Senate version of the
1971 FECA, for example, there was a provision for such a commission but it was deleted by the
House-Senate conference committee. See S. 956, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. § 310, 117 CONG. REC. 3887
(1971); see also Note, Congress and Public Policy: A Study of the Federal Election Campaign Act of
1971, 10 HARV. J. ON LEcts. 331, 354 (1973).
46. See supra note 4.
47. 424 U.S. at 127.
48. As is frequently true in the passage of major legislation, the motive forces behind the legisla-
tion are not found solely in the congressional debates, but also in the contemporaneous events. For
example, on October 20, 1973, President Nixon issued a direct order to Watergate Special Prosecutor
Archibald Cox to stop seeking crucial White House tape recordings of Oval Office conversations.
When Cox refused, the President ordered Attorney General Elliot Richardson to fire Cox. Richardson
refused and resigned instead. Richardson's deputy, William D. Ruckelshaus, refused to dismiss Cox;
he, too, was fired. Eventually, the third man in line at the Department of Justice, Solicitor General
Robert H. Bork, carried out Nixon's order and dismissed Cox. The United States District Court for
the District of Columbia later found that Cox's dismissal "in the absence of a finding of extraordinary
impropriety was in clear violation of an existing Justice Department regulation having the force of
law and was therefore illegal." Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104, 108 (D.D.C. 1973). The regulation
provided that "[tihe Special Prosecutor will not be removed from his duties except for extraordinary
improprieties on his part." Office of Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 28 C.F.R. § 0.37 (1973).
49. S. REP. No. 981, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 130 (1974). For example, the Report found that White
House efforts to have the Internal Revenue Service audit "left wing organizations" and attempts to
get IRS information for political purposes "all attest to the serious efforts made by the White House
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In its final report, the Senate Watergate Committee recommended that
"the Congress enact legislation to establish an independent, nonpartisan
Federal Election Commission.""0 As the Committee explained:
Probably the most significant reform that could emerge from the
Watergate scandal is the creation of an independent nonpartisan
agency to supervise the enforcement of the laws relating to the con-
duct of elections. Such a body-given substantial investigatory and
enforcement powers-could not only help insure that misconduct
would be prevented in the future, but that investigations of alleged
wrongdoing would be vigorous and conducted with the confidence of
the public. 1
In response, Congress in 1974 amended FECA to create the Federal Elec-
tion Commission. 2
The 1974 FECA amendments had their origins in two bills. Congress
sought to strengthen and centralize administration of the Act in a special-
ized agency which would take over the responsibilities (largely the receipt
of campaign disclosure reports) vested by the 1971 Act in the Clerk of the
to use an independent Government agency for political purposes." Id.
The potential use of federal statutes for political headhunting was recognized by President Nixon.
On the tape dated September 15, 1972, Nixon remarked about his political enemies: "[Tjhey are
asking for it and they are going to get it. We have not used the power . . . [of] the [Federal] Bureau
[of Investigation or] . . . the Justice Department. But things are going to change now." G. GOLD,
THE WHrIE HousE. TRANSCRIPTS 63 (1973). Another example of this attitude is the August 16,
1971 memorandum prepared by White House counsel John Dean, entitled "Dealing With Our Polit-
ical Enemies," which Dean summarized as addressing "how we can maximize the fact of our incum-
bency in dealing with persons known to be active in their opposition to our administration. Stated a
bit more bluntly-how we can use the available federal machinery to screw our political enemies."
Hearings Before the Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities, 93d Cong., 1st Sess.
1689 (1973) [hereinafter Senate Select Comm.] (emphasis in original).
50. Senate Select Comm., supra note 49, at 564.
51. Id. One of the first to propose an independent Federal Election Commission as a response to
executive abuses was Senator Hubert H. Humphrey. In debates on the public financing of presiden-
tial elections, Humphrey stated:
Finally, there should be an election review board which oversees all the aspects of political
campaigns. The temptation to politicize the Department of Justice, which currently has juris-
diction over such matters, is or has been apparently too great to resist. Therefore, an indepen-
dent body is necessary to properly execute the election laws in an impartial and nonpartisan
manner.
119 CONG. RF(:. 21,677 (1973).
52. The 1974 FECA amendments were not the only reforms which grew out of Watergate.
Congress also passed the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824
(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 701-709; 5 U.S.C. § 5316; 18 U.S.C. § 207; 28 U.S.C. §§ 49,
529, 591-598, 1364 (1982)), which required financial disclosure by elected and appointed officials in
all three branches of government, set up the Office of Government Ethics, and established machinery
for the appointment of a special prosecutor to deal with abuses by government officials. Other reforms
included the 1973 War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 55 (codified as amended at
50 U.S.C. § 1541 (1982)) and the Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88 Stat.
297 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 681-688 (1982)), which were aimed at curbing executive
powers.
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House, the Secretary of the Senate, and the Comptroller General. The
original Senate bill,53 introduced by Senator Howard Cannon, would have
created a seven-member commission appointed by the President, with
Senate confirmation, to seven-year terms. Two of the Commissioners were
to be chosen from persons recommended by the President pro tempore of
the Senate, upon recommendation of the majority and minority leaders of
the Senate; and two were to be chosen from persons recommended by the
Speaker of the House of Representatives, upon recommendation of the
majority and minority leaders of the House. The remaining three mem-
bers were to be chosen directly by the President.
The idea for a commission appointed by Congress which would exercise
the powers thought necessary for enforcement of the campaign finance
laws originated in the House. Wayne Hays, Chairman of the Committee
on House Administration, introduced a bill, H.R. 16,090," to establish a
seven-member board of supervisory officers. The board was to be com-
posed of the Secretary of the Senate, the Clerk of the House, the Comp-
troller General, and four "public members"-two appointed by the Presi-
dent of the Senate, upon recommendation of the Senate majority and
minority leaders, and two appointed by the Speaker of the House, upon
recommendation of the House majority and minority leaders. The four
appointees, who would serve on a part-time basis for four years, would
not be subject to either presidential review or congressional confirmation.
Although the original Senate proposal of a seven-member Federal Elec-
tion Commission passed the Senate without amendment by a 53-32 vote,5"
the House version with its board of supervisory officers encountered stiff
resistance. In the House report recommending approval of H.R. 16,090
and its enforcement approach, Representative Bill Frenzel filed supple-
mental views criticizing this scheme for placing "four appointees of Con-
gress and three employees of Congress in charge of administration and
enforcement of election law."5" Frenzel concluded, "[n]ot only is the fox in
charge of the chicken coop, he is living in the farm house and managing
the farm." '57
As an alternative, Frenzel proposed the creation of a six-member Fed-
eral Election Commission to be appointed by the President from lists sub-
mitted by congressional leaders from the House and Senate in order "to
assure the Commission's independence.""6 Frenzel also argued that his
53. S. 3044, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 120 CONG. REC. 10,952-64 (1974).
54. H.R. 16,090, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., 119 CONG. REC. 27,474 (1974).
55. 120 CONG. REC. 10,952 (1974).
56. H.R. RE:P. No. 1239, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 131 (1974) (supplemental views of Rep. Frenzel).
57. Id.
58. Id. at 138.
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proposal, unlike the Hays proposal, was constitutionally sound because it
recognized that "under Article II . . .the President appoints the members
of the Commission."59
Once H.R. 16,090 was reported out of committee, the Frenzel proposal
for an independent commission rapidly gained support. Its main obstacle
was Chairman Hays, who strongly opposed the Senate presidential
appointment plan because he preferred an enforcement agency controlled
by congressional leaders. In a last minute move to stave off a fierce, uncer-
tain fight over the bill's enforcement provision, Hays called a meeting of
his House Administration Committee to work out a compromise. 60
The next day, August 8, 1974, Congressman John Brademas intro-
duced a compromise amendment to H.R. 16,090 formulated by the House
Administration Committee. Brademas explained that the amendment was
meant "to respond to criticism of the language in the committee bill
wherein congressional employees were seated on the board." '61 The
amendment provided for a board of supervisory officers composed of four
public members-two to be appointed by the Speaker of the House and
two by the President of the Senate on a bipartisan basis. The Clerk of the
House and the Secretary of the Senate were also to sit on the Board, but
in a non-voting capacity.
The compromise amendment was opposed, however, by those concerned
that such an independent supervisory board could turn against Congress,
especially if the Clerk of the House and the Secretary of the Senate could
not vote. Representative Dawson Mathis warned:
We are going to set up a bunch of headhunters down here who are
going to spend their full time trying to make a name for themselves
persecuting and prosecuting Members of Congress. . . .Members
had better watch their heads once the Commission is established.62
59. Id. Representative Frenzel believed that it was essential to give "the President this limited
discretion mainly because the Presidential appointment is absolutely necessary if the Commission is to
be given any authority to enforce campaign laws in the court." Id. The lack of a presidential appoint-
ment was, in Frenzel's view, a "fatal defect in H.R. 16,090." Id. Since Hays's proposed supervisory
board would not be presidentially appointed, Frenzel concluded that the board would have "no en-
forcement powers and cannot be given those powers." Id.
60. CoN;. Q., August 10, 1974, at 2192.
61. 120 CONG. RFC. 27,471 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Brademas).
62. Id. at 27,473 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Mathis). Representative Mathis further stated that a
Federal Election Commission was unnecessary because the Clerk of the House and the Secretary of
the Senate were doing an adequate job and that problems with enforcement rested with the Depart-
ment of Justice: "There have been over 5,000 violations of the 1971 Act referred to the Department of
Justice for prosecution, and I am informed that there have been three which have been followed
through on." Id. Mathis also opposed the compromise because it allowed the White House to appoint
two members: "We do not know who is going to be on this Commission; we have no idea. It might
have been two years ago the members might have been Ehrlichman, Mitchell, Haldeman and Dean."
Id.
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Similarly, Representative Bill Burlison warned that "with this amend-
ment we are setting the stage for making it impossible for an incumbent to
get a fair shake before this group."63 Thus, in addition to congressional
worries with respect to executive domination of the Commission, members
of the House were also concerned with the regulation of their own activi-
ties by a board of supervisory officers.
Even as the House compromise emerged, however, the argument that
the agency should be independent prevailed. Speaking in support of the
compromise amendment, Representative Dante Fascell expressed the sen-
timents of the House when he stressed the need for an "independent en-
forcement Commission," '64 which he characterized as the "heart and crux
of campaign reform."66 Fascell concluded that "the credibility of Congress
is at stake" and "unless we make adequate provision for the independent
and vigorous enforcement of the limitations we enact, we will remain open
to charges of conflict of interest and public distrust will continue." 6 The
compromise amendment was adopted by a 391-25 vote.6
The final bill, which passed both Houses by wide margins,6 8 estab-
lished a commission broadly empowered to issue rules, require submission
of campaign disclosure reports, conduct investigations, subpoena witnesses,
issue advisory opinions, and initiate civil actions itself or request the At-
torney General to institute civil or criminal actions to enforce the statute."
The Commission could also temporarily disqualify any candidate for elec-
tion to federal office for failing to comply with FECA reporting
regulations. °
Congress also took steps to assure that the Commission would not be-
come a vehicle for partisan purposes. It sought to protect the Commis-
sion's partisan balance, integrity, and independence from possible legisla-
tive or executive manipulation. The bill explicitly stated the need for
public confidence in the Commission's freedom from outside influence7'
and created an unusual structural conflict within the FEC to safeguard
63. Id. (remarks of Rep. Burlison).
64. Id. at 27,472 (remarks of Rep. Fascell). Rep. Fascell observed that "the elections commission
besides having the primary supervisory and enforcement authority, is given full independent authority
to seek enforcement through civil action in court by way of injunction or other appropriate relief
without the necessity of submitting the matter to the Attorney General first." Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 27,473-74.
68. The Senate passed the bill by a 60-16 margin, 120 CONG. REC. 34,392 (1974); the House
passed the bill by 365-24, id. at 35,148.
69. See 2 U.S.C. § 437d (Supp. V 1975).
70. 2 U.S.C. § 456 (Supp. V 1975) (repealed 1976).
71. The bill stated:
Members shall be chosen on the basis of their maturity, experience, integrity, impartiality, and
good judgment and shall be chosen from among individuals who at the time of their appoint-
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against domination of the Commission by one political party. The confer-
ees provided that no more than three members of the Commission be
members of the same political party. 72 A plurality of at least four votes
would be required for the Commission to exercise any of its central pow-
ers. 73 Unlike other regulatory agencies which have an odd number of
members, one of whom is designated as permanent chairman, the FECA
provided for a rotating chairmanship, with a new chairman to be selected
by the members each year.7 '
Innovative appointment procedures were intended to guarantee that
Congress would not concede complete political control of the new Com-
mission to the executive. Two members of the Commission would be ap-
pointed by the President pro tempore of the Senate upon recommendation
of the Senate majority and minority leaders; two members by the Speaker
of the House upon recommendation of the House majority and minority
leaders; and two members by the President. All six members would be
subject to confirmation by a majority vote of each House of Congress. 75
Comments in both Houses indicated that the legislators believed the bill
met their goal of establishing an independent body. House comments re-
vealed a consensus that the conference bill provided for a "strong indepen-
dent commission to enforce provisions of this act. ' '71 Similarly, the Senate
believed that the conference bill had produced, in the words of Senate
Minority Leader Hugh Scott, "an independent Federal Election Commis-
sion. ' ' 7 As summarized by Representative Frenzel, "[tlhe establishment of
an independent Commission is the key provision in the bill. It will assure
ment, are not elected or appointed officers or employees in the executive, legislative, or judicial
branch of the Government of the United States.
2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(3) (Supp. V 1975).
72. 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(l) (Supp. V 1975).
73. Id.
74. 2 U.S.C. § 437c(a)(5) (Supp. V 1975). The section further requires that "the Chairman and
Vice-Chairman shall not be affiliated with the same political party." Congress's concern that the
Commission, in light of its uniquely sensitive mission, have the greatest degree of flexibility and inde-
pendence possible, is evidenced by several other specific statutory provisions. For instance, Congress
provided that the two most senior positions at the Commission, the staff director and the general
counsel, be executive level positions with the incumbents serving at the pleasure of the Commission. 2
U.S.C. § 437c(f)(1) (1982). Congress also provided a special procedure whereby the Commission
could make budget submissions directly to Congress as well as to the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB). Furthermore, the statute prohibited the Commission from submitting legislative rec-
ommendations or testimony or comments on legislation to the OMB prior to the legislation's submis-
sion to Congress. 2 U.S.C. § 437d(d)(2) (1982).
75. Comments in both the House and Senate indicated that Congress was pleased that the new
Commission would not be presidentially appointed in its entirety. 120 CONG. REC. 35,134 (1974)
(remarks of Rep. Sieberling); id. at 35,377 (1974) (remarks of Sen. Clark).
76. Id. at 35,135 (remarks of Rep. Armstrong).
77. Id. at 34,373 (remarks of Sen. Scott).
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judicious, expeditious enforcement of the law, while reversing the long
history of nonenforcement. '17
III. The Constitutional Debate Over Independent Agencies
The constitutional debate surrounding independent regulatory agencies
has focused on their accountability within the constitutional scheme, and
particularly on their supposed lack of a legitimate locus within the three
branches of government. However, the separation of powers should not be
rigidly construed; a certain cooperation and blending of powers must oc-
cur to insure the balance of powers and the accountability of the three
branches of government to each other and to the public at large. The Fed-
eral Election Commission is one example of an independent agency that
facilitates such a balance.
A. Opposition to Independent Agencies
Congress's judgment that the creation of an independent FEC was nec-
essary and proper to prevent abuses of campaign finance law while shield-
ing the administration of the law from executive or legislative interference
and retaliatory removal was not, in itself, sufficient to activate the legisla-
tion under the necessary and proper clause. Though the legislators consid-
ered such independence essential for the Commission to carry out its du-
ties, any statutory provision that reflects what Congress deems
appropriate under the necessary and proper clause must also be consistent
with, and not prohibited by, the "letter and spirit of the Constitution.""
Opponents of independent agencies generally make the argument that
the separation of powers mandates that each governmental function be
labeled "executive," "legislative," or "judicial," and then assigned inflexi-
bly to one of these branches and to no other. 80 This syllogistic approach
contends that any agency exercising enforcement powers is performing ex-
ecutive functions and therefore must fall under the control and direction of
the President, since the executive is responsible for executing the laws.8
"From a practical point of view the only way in which Congress can
make the regulatory commissions independent is by limiting the discre-
tionary power of the President to remove their members from office,"
Robert Cushman has observed, because "if he can remove them at pleas-
ure, he can control them; if he cannot remove them, he cannot control
78. Id. at 35,135 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Frenzel).
79. Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263, 283 (1892).
80. See, e.g., Strauss, supra note 2; Note, Fallen Angels, supra note 2.
81. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1.
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them."8 Accordingly, opponents of agency independence argue that com-
missioners must serve at the pleasure of the President because they exer-
cise executive functions and therefore must be controlled by the executive.
Notwithstanding this argument, the FEC is within the "letter and spirit
of the Constitution." Congress has the power to make laws "necessary
and proper" to carry into effect the powers "vested by this Constitution in
the Government of the United States, or in any Department thereof."88
Thus, Congress may establish an independent commission to ensure that
the executive "take[s] care that the laws are faithfully executed." '84
As the following sections will show, this conclusion is consistent with
the Supreme Court's indication in Buckley v. Valeo that Federal Election
Commissioners, if nominated by the President and subject to Senate con-
firmation, could constitutionally exercise independent executive powers. In
addition, the status and purpose of the FEC conforms with the historical
and theoretical underpinnings of separation of powers theory. Finally,
there is nothing in the President's removal power-a power nowhere spe-
cifically mentioned in the Constitution-which gives the executive author-
ity to remove members of an independent commission.
B. Buckley v. Valeo and the Challenge to the FEC's Constitutionality
Congress included in its final version of FECA an extraordinary juris-
dictional provision expediting Supreme Court review when the agency's
constitutionality was challenged. 88 This provision was used in Buckley v.
Valeo,86 wherein the Supreme Court held, among other things, that the
combined congressional-presidential appointment method for Federal
Election Commissioners under the 1974 FECA violated the appointments
clause of the Constititution.87 Because the Commissioners were neither
nominated by the President nor appointed by the President alone during a
congressional recess, but rather appointed by the House and Senate lead-
ership, they could not legally perform executive functions.
The Commission's law enforcement responsibilities were executive
functions88 in the eyes of the Court, dischargeable only by appropriately
82. R. CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS 454 (1941).
83. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
84. Id. art. II, § 3.
85. 2 U.S.C. § 437h (1982). See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
86. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
87. U.S. CONST. art. 11, § 2, cl. 2 ("[The President] shall nominate, and by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint . . . Officers of the United States").
88. The Buckley majority characterized the constitutional questions, as it has frequently done
elsewhere in recent terms, as susceptible to resolution by a strict separation of powers analysis which
seeks to identify and categorize particular powers as "executive," "legislative," or "judicial." See
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 118-24. See also INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); cf Strauss, supra note 2,
at 616-21, 625-39 (critical analysis of strict separation of powers approach). As Professor Strauss'
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appointed "Officers of the United States."89 The Court indicated that this
was particularly true of the Commission's power to bring civil actions
against violators.9" It also concluded that the Commission's rulemaking
and advisory opinion powers, together with its authority to determine can-
didate eligibility for federal funding, gave the Commission substantial ad-
ditional authority that was executive in nature.9" The Court declared that
the Commission, as constituted, could only continue to exercise informa-
tional and certain investigatory responsibilities "which Congress might
delegate to one of its own committees,""' and would have to curtail its
executive actions unless the appointment process was appropriately
altered.
The Supreme Court thus fully understood the nature and breadth of
the Commission's enforcement authority."3 It is equally clear that
analysis suggests, it is not yet clear exactly how the Court intends to ascertain how particular powers
are "executive" as opposed to "legislative." The question how to decide whether particular powers,
such as rulemaking or subpoena, are legislative or executive thus still lies ahead.
89. 424 U.S. at 125-26.
90. Id. at 138.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 137. Buckley, though not the first incident of this kind, strikingly exemplifies what has
become commonplace: the executive, rather than defending the constitutionality of laws it is its duty
faithfully to execute, has either refused to defend or, on occasion, actually challenged the constitution-
ality of congressional enactments signed by the President. In Buckley, the Justice Department's so-
called amicus brief on behalf of the Commission consisted of five sections, and while the first four did
defend the statute, the beginning of the fifth section argued that it should be declared unconstitutional
with respect to the manner of appointment of the Commissioners. Brief for the Government as Ami-
cus Curiae, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (No. 75-436). This approach is certainly wrong.
"Execution" of the laws means enforcement and defense; it emphatically does not mean "killing"
some laws that the President does not like. Just as it has long been established that federal adminis-
trative agencies are without power or expertise to pass upon the constitutionality of legislative action,
see, e.g., Oesterich v. Selective Service Bd., 393 U.S. 233, 242 (1968); Speigel, Inc. v. FTC, 540 F.2d
287, 294 (7th Cir. 1976), so the President or the Department of Justice should be considered without
power to contest the constitutionality of legislative action-at least as a condition of determining which
laws will or will not be faithfully executed and defended. This is particularly so where, as with the
1974 FECA, the statute had been approved by the President. See Miller & Bowman, Presidential
Attacks on the Constitutionality of Federal Statutes: A New Separation of Powers Problem, 40 OHIo
ST. L.J. 51 (1979).
93. 424 U.S. at 163-67 and 169-73. Sections 437c, d, and g of the Act were reprinted in the
appendix to the Court's opinion in Buckley. These provisions detailed the Commission's general pow-
ers along with their administrative and enforcement authority. The Justice Department, in its brief to
the District Court in Buckley, expressly approved the FEC's exercise of the powers it had been
granted by the statute. The Justice Department argued only that the Act "purports to vest power
civilly to enforce the law in the Federal Election Commission, a legislative body. Such an attempted
grant of power runs afoul of the separation of powers expressed in the Constitution." The Depart-
ment noted, "It is clear that this problem may easily be eliminated by Congress, for the only remedia-
tion necessary would be amendment of the Act to provide that the President appoint all Commission
members." Brief for the Attorney General at 7 n.6. (emphasis supplied), Buckley v. Valeo, 387 F.
Supp. 135 (D.D.C. 1975) (No. 75-0001).
Similarly, in his brief to the Supreme Court in Buckley, Attorney General Levi wrote:
[T]he members of the independent regulatory Commissions are "Officers of the United States"
within the meaning of Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution. They are appointed by the
President and are confirmed by the Senate. In consequence, they can share, much as cabinet
officers share, in the power granted by Article II to execute the laws. Members of the [Federal
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Congress intended this enforcement authority to be exercised free of the
President's supervisory control. The Court did not question Congress's
entrustment of enforcement authority to the Federal Election Commission.
Rather, it held that the Commission could exercise this significant execu-
tive responsibility so long as the Commissioners were executive branch
appointees under the appointments power and thus "Officers of the
United States."94
Reserving questions which might be presented under other provisions of
the Constitution, 5 the Court indicated that curing the appointments de-
fect would enable a reconstituted agency to exercise the executive enforce-
ment powers. The Court found no need to discuss the congressional judg-
ment that the agency should be insulated from either executive or
legislative branch day-to-day control over its functions. Rather, the Court
listed the powers assigned to the agency generally, and specifically indi-
cated those which could be exercised by a reconstituted Commission." In
so doing, the Court approved the assignment of these powers to an inde-
pendent agency.
This Supreme Court imprimatur of constitutionality also appeared in
other dicta of the Court. Even though it found the Commission to be un-
constitutionally organized, the Court accorded the Commission's past ac-
tions defacto validity: "It is also our view that the Commission's inability
to exercise certain powers because of the method by which its members
have been selected should not affect the validity of the Commission's ad-
ministrative actions and determinations to this date. . . .-M The Supreme
Court has long recognized a distinction between the unconstitutionality of
a governmental body and the use of unconstitutional means to select its
members. If the body itself is invalid, its acts are without force or effect;
however, if the defect relates only to the manner in which the officeholders
are selected, then their acts may be given de facto validity." s
Election] Commission are not "Officers of the United States" and, in consequence, possess no
.power under Article II.
Brief for the Attorney General as Appellee and for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 121 n.78,
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (No. 75-436) (emphasis supplied).
94. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
95. 424 U.S. at 137 n.175. The Court was particularly concerned with 2 U.S.C. § 456 (1982),
which empowered the Commission to disqualify a federal candidate for failing to file campaign
reports.
96. 424 U.S. at 137-43.
97. Id. at 142 (emphasis supplied).
98. See Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442 (1886) (board of county commissioners that
was found unconstitutional could not issue valid bonds); but see Connor v. Williams, 404 U.S. 549,
550-51 (1972) (elections not invalidated despite need for reorganizing congressional districts at polling
date); Schaefer v. Thomson, 251 F. Supp. 450, 453 (D. Wyo. 1965) (malapportionment of state
senate's representation did not invalidate its legislation), affd sub nom. Harrison v. Schaefer, 383
U.S. 269 (1966).
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Not only did the Supreme Court accept the past acts of the Commission
as valid, it also stayed its judgment in Buckley for thirty days. The stay
explicitly allowed "the present Commission" to complete unfinished busi-
ness pending at the time of Buckley and to "afford Congress an opportu-
nity" to remedy the constitutional defects contained in the Commission's
manner of appointment." The Court cited the malapportionment cases,
where it had recognized that the doctrine of de facto validity could be
applied prospectively, since the selection of legislators, rather than the leg-
islature itself, had been constitutionally attacked. ° Thus, by issuing a
stay, the Court gave further indication that it approved of the Commission
as an independent institution.
The Court further indicated its approval of the powers exercised by the
Commission by suggesting that Congress could "reconstitute the Commis-
sion by law."' ' In other words, the Congress could simply provide for the
appointment of Commission members by the President alone. This ap-
proach would be consistent with the Court's view of the appointments
clause and would allow the Commission to employ its enforcement,
rulemaking, advisory opinion, and administrative powers. The Court also
suggested that Congress could "adopt other valid enforcement mechanisms
without interrupting enforcement of the provisions the Court sustains."'0 2
Plainly, the Court considered a reconstituted Commission to be a valid
enforcement mechanism.
The Court's subsequent willingness to extend the stay further demon-
strated its expectation of the Commission's reconstitution, rather than a
more general congressional reassessment of the allocation of powers be-
tween other agencies and Congress. Senator Howard Cannon and Senate
Majority Leader Mike Mansfield had made an unusual written request to
the Chief Justice days before the stay was to expire:
Dear Mr. Chief Justice:
We are writing to the Court in support of the motion filed today
to extend the stay in Buckley v. Valeo (nos. 75-436, 75-437) of the
portions of the Court's judgment that prevent the Federal Election
Commission from exercising certain powers because of the constitu-
tional defect in the appointment of the Commission members.
We wish to inform the Court that the Senate is moving forward
expeditiously with legislation to establish the Commission in a con-
stitutional manner, in accord with the Court's decision .... It is the
99. 424 U.S. at 143.
100. Id. (citing Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526 (1973); Fortson v. United States, 385 U.S.
231 (1966); Maryland Comm. v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 656 (1964)).
101. 424 U.S. at 143.
102. Id.
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intention of the Senate Democratic leadership to schedule the bill for
floor action at the earliest practical opportunity.
We believe that if the Court's stay is extended for an additional
period of time, in accord with the motion filed today, the Senate will
be able to act more effectively on the issues before us than in the
atmosphere that would exist if the Court's stay were allowed to ex-
pire, with potentially disruptive consequences for the Commission
and its important functions with respect to the ongoing 1976
elections.
Therefore, we request the Court to extend the stay, so that the
Federal Election Commission can continue to perform the full range
of its functions during the brief additional period before legislation is
sent to the President.103
The Supreme Court accepted the congressional representation that it was
moving toward reconstitution and extended its stay of judgment and the
Commission's ability to exercise powers until March 22, 1976.04 These
extraordinary actions facilitating reconstitution further demonstrate the
Court's acceptance of the FEC as an independent agency.
The Court's reasoning relied heavily on the specificity of the appoint-
ments clause, and the history of its passage at the Constitutional Conven-
tion."'5 Noting that earlier drafts at the Convention had given the Senate
power to appoint Justices of the Supreme Court and ambassadors, and
had given the President power to appoint all other officers of the United
States, the Court pointed to the compromise that finally emerged. The
power of appointment was shared, so that the President nominated and
the Senate confirmed all officers of the United States.'" The Justices were
convinced by their examination of the Convention debate that the Conven-
tion had specifically disposed of the question of appointment by making
103. Letter from H. Cannon and M. Mansfield to Chief Justice Burger (Feb. 27, 1976) (on file
with the authors). Appellants were quick to oppose the Cannon-Mansfield letter to the Chief Justice
and the Commission's motion to support it. Arguing that "Congress has acted in its refusal thus far to
pass enabling legislation for the reconstitution of the Federal Election Commission," appellants char-
acterized the request for an extension of the stay in this manner: "[Aippellees are asking this Court to
become a direct participant in the legislative process and to lend its assistance in the passage of the
[1976 Amendments to FECA]." Appellants' Opposition to a Further Stay of the Court's Judgment 2,
4, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (No. 75-436). They explicitly protested:
[Tlhis extraordinary attempt by the Chairman of the Rules Committee and the Majority
Leader to pressure this Court into assisting them in passage of legislation which is extremely
controversial and of a highly partisan nature demonstrates the high risk this Court faces in
entangling itself in the legislative process and the political arena should it grant the private
appellees' motion.
Appellants' Memorandum Respecting a Letter From Senators Cannon and Mansfield to the Chief
Justice at 2 (Feb. 27, 1976), Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (No. 75-436) (on file with the
authors).
104. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 936 (1976).
105. Id. at 128-31.
106. Id. at 131.
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the appointments clause refer to "all appointed officials exercising respon-
sibility under the public laws of the Nation."107
The Court stated that the functions Congress had given the Commis-
sion included:
functions relating to the flow of necessary information-receipt, dis-
semination, and investigation; functions with respect to the Commis-
sion's task of fleshing out the statute-rulemaking and advisory
opinions; and functions necessary to insure compliance with the stat-
ute and rules-informal procedures, administrative determinations
and hearings, and civil suits. 08
The Court held that, except for the first group of powers, which Congress
could itself exercise directly, the "more substantial" powers, especially the
power to bring court actions, could be exercised only by officers of the
United States: "A lawsuit is the ultimate remedy for a breach of the law,
and it is to the President, and not to the Congress, that the Constitution
entrusts the responsibility to 'take care that the laws be faithfully
executed.' "109
After rejecting the argument that the necessary and proper clause al-
lowed Congress to override the express language of the appointments
clause, the Court asserted that litigation has generally been considered
executive in nature. " The Court held that the Commission's power to
vindicate public rights through litigation violated Article II, section 2,
clause 2 of the Constitution, because the employees of the Commission
were not duly appointed officers of the United States."' The Court con-
cluded that the Commission's authority to make rules, issue advisory opin-
ions, and determine candidates' eligibility to receive campaign funds and
hold office was of the kind ordinarily held by regulatory agencies under
the direction of congressional legislation.' It emphasized that the Com-
mission's executive powers were much broader than those generally exer-
cised by many independent agencies, and cited Humphrey's Executor for
the proposition that "the President may not insist that such functions be
107. Id.
108. Id. at 137.
109. Id. at 138 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).
110. Id. at 139. Of course, at the time of the Constitution's drafting, private rather than public
enforcement of the law was the rule of the day; indeed, Congress did not establish the Department of
Justice until 1870. Act of June 22, 1870, ch. 150, 16 Stat. 162 (1870) (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. §§ 501-575 (1986)). See Landes and Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 1-2 (1975).
111. 424 U.S. at 140.
112. Id. at 140-41.
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delegated to an appointee of his removable at will."1 ' While finally re-
serving judgment on any explicit power that Congress saw fit to place in a
reconstituted FEC,114 the Court assumed that the powers characterized as
executive in nature, including the power to enforce the FECA through
suits in the courts of the United States, could be exercised by a reconsti-
tuted agency."'
Congressional reaction to the Buckley decision, though not swift, 6
showed a willingness to reconstitute the FEC in the manner the Court
suggested, even though Congress had lost the political battle to retain con-
trol of the agency by excluding the President from the appointment pro-
cess."' The legislative history of the 1976 FECA amendments indicates
that Congress intentionally maintained the Commission as an independent
monitor of the operation of the Federal Election Campaign Act, with the
same mix of powers it had held previously." 8 The executive also reacted
favorably to Buckley's resolution: President Ford expressly noted with ap-
proval, as he signed the legislation reconstituting the Commission, the
need for "a Commission with valid rulemaking and enforcement
powers.""'
C. Constitutionality and Accountability
Here we address the underlying rationale for the criticism of indepen-
dent agencies under separation of powers doctrine, namely, their lack of
accountability to the legislature or executive, and show why this criticism
carries little weight against the FEC. Agency independence does not imply
agency unaccountability. A number of formal mechanisms permit Con-
gress, the President, and the courts to exert a large measure of authority
over the powers, membership and activities of independent commissions.
First, Congress, when it passes legislation, not only creates a commission,
it also determines what powers the commission may exercise and the lim-
its on those powers.1 0 The annual budget process provides the House and
113. Id. at 141.
114. Id. at 137 n.175.
115. Id. at 137.
116. The 1976 FECA Amendments were passed three months later. Federal Election Campaign
Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475 (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-442 (1982)).
117. The 1976 FECA passed the House by a 291-81 vote. 122 CONG. REC. 12,209 (1976). The
Senate passed the measure by a 62-29 vote. 122 CONG. REC. 12,477 (1976).
118. See, e.g., Hearings on Bills to Amend the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, As
Amended, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, 68, 89 (1976).
119. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, 12 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 858
(May 11, 1976).
120. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 177 (1926) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (Congress may
regulate, but not participate in, executive removal power). Indeed, Congress allows regulated entities
to seek not only full administrative and judicial review of agency action, but also legislative curtail-
ment of agency powers.
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Senate appropriations committees with an opportunity both to review past
agency actions and to chart a course for future policy. This can be
achieved by adjusting appropriation levels or by placing conditions on the
use of agency funds. 2 ' Indeed, Congress may even, by passing or repeal-
ing a statute, decide to abolish a commission. Moreover, the Senate must
confirm the appointment of commissioners to office. 22
Similarly, the President has significant power over independent agen-
cies. The executive branch, through the Office of Management and
Budget, has authority to review and revise independent commission
budget requests and legislative recommendations. 2 Through the appoint-
ment process, the President selects and nominates commissioners, and in
some instances, selects a chairman for the commission. 2' With regard to
many agencies, "the Justice Department coordinates, even conducts their
litigation."' 2 5
Finally, the courts provide a check on the powers of independent com-
missions. It is well established that courts should normally defer to the
experience and judgment of the agency to which Congress delegated ap-
propriate authority.' 6 But a court may set aside agency action if the
agency acted in a manner which was found to be arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion, or contrary to law.' 7
121. See Ribicoff, Congressional Oversight and Regulatory Reform, 28 ADMIN. L. REV. 415,
417-18 (1976) (Congressional oversight defined as "analyzing the administrative implementation of
legislation, making sure that the agencies are doing their jobs properly").
122. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 2.
123. The FEC is an exception. 2 U.S.C. § 437d (1982). For a discussion of the scope of OMB's
authority over substantive agency decisions, see Note, Regulatory Analyses and Judicial Review of
Informal Rulemaking, 91 YALE L.J. 739, 746-49, 753-57 (1982); see also Morrison, OMB Interfer-
ence With Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way To Write A Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1059
(1986); DeMuth & Ginsburg, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075
(1986).
124. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 242 (1982) (Federal Reserve Board); 15 U.S.C. § 2053(a) (1982)
(Consumer Product Safety Commission); 49 U.S.C. § 1321(a)(2) (1982) (Civil Aeronautics Board)
(repealed 1985).
125. SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 5 STUDY ON FEDERAL REGULATION, S.
Doc. No. 811, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 55 (1977). Unlike most regulatory agencies, the Federal Election
Commission was not established in, and was never intended to conform to, the traditional model of a
client agency of the Department of Justice. Congress expressly authorized the Commission to appear
in and defend against actions brought under the FECA. 2 U.S.C. § 437c(f)(4) (1982). The legislative
history of 1976 FECA contains repeated assertions of and support for the Commission's independent
power to conduct its own litigation. See, e.g., 122 CONG. REC. 12,203 (1976) (remarks of Rep.
Brademas); 122 CONG. REC. 12,470-71 (1976) (remarks of Sen. Brock); 122 CONG. REC. 7288, 7289
(1976) (remarks of Sen. Cannon).
126. See, e.g., NLRB v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 344 U.S. 344, 349 (1953).
127. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1982).
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D. Independent Agencies as Checks on Executive Authority
Anyone who argues that the separation of powers requires abdicating
complete control of administrative officers to the President must be admit-
ting that there need be no check on presidential authority-a conclusion
actually inconsistent with the doctrine of separation of powers. As James
Madison argued, the concentration of all governmental powers in the
same hands is "the very definition of tyranny.11 28 Indeed, as Professor
Kenneth Culp Davis has observed, "We have learned that danger of tyr-
anny or injustice lurks in unchecked power, not in blended power." ' 9
The FEC, by establishing checks and monitors on executive as well as
legislative power, actually strengthens the balance of powers which is the
objective of separation of powers doctrine. Ordinarily, prosecutions are
under the complete control and direction of the President. Congress has
concluded, however, that the President and his close associates and politi-
cal friends, who may be interested parties, should not be allowed to prose-
cute FECA campaign finance violations. The rationale seems clear. There
are probably few political interests as powerful as an administration's in-
terest in securing its own reelection or the election of its congressional
allies. In creating an independent commission to administer campaign fi-
nance laws, Congress acknowledged the fundamental principle that no
man can be the judge of his own case.
The separation of powers doctrine should not be understood as a preoc-
cupation with a mechanistic segregation of governmental functions.
Rather, it is a means of securing the accountability of coordinate govern-
mental branches. It contewplates that each branch of government will
check the activities of others, while allowing them to cooperate fully. Jus-
tice Jackson recognized the dual objectives of the theory in Youngstown
Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, writing:
The actual art of governing under our Constitution does not and
cannot conform to judicial definitions of the power of any of its
branches based on isolated clauses or even single Articles torn from
context. While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure
liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed
powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches
separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity."'
128. THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 336 (j. Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1961).
129. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 74 (1958). Madison put it another way: "In
framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this;
you must first enable the government to control the governed; and in the next place oblige it to control
itself." THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 356 (J. Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1961).
130. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) Uackson, J.,
concurring).
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Similarly, Justice Story believed that even though the Framers accepted a
tripartite division of government, they "endeavored to prove that a rigid
adherence to it in all cases would be subversive of the efficiency of govern-
ment, and result in the destruction of public liberties."1'31
In allocating the powers of government among the President, Congress,
and the judiciary, the Framers did not intend that the three branches re-
main completely separate. No such requirement appears anywhere in the
Constitution. It is true that Montesquieu, whose philosophy greatly influ-
enced the Framers, had stated, "[Wlhen the legislative and executive pow-
ers are under or in the same person or body ... there can be no lib-
erty." ' 2 But Madison argued that this maxim "has been totally
misconceived and [mislapplied," explaining that Montesquieu
did not mean that these departments [of government] ought to have
no partial agency in, or no control over, the acts of each other. His
meaning, as his own words import . . . can amount to no more than
this, that where the whole power of one department is exercised by
the same hands which possess the whole power of another depart-
ment, the fundamental principles of a free constitution are
subverted.'
Indeed, as the Supreme Court stated in Buckley, it is "clear from the pro-
visions of the Constitution itself, and from the Federalist Papers, that the
Constitution by no means contemplates total separation of each of these
three essential branches of Government. 134
In Buckley, the Court explained the assumption of cooperation underly-
ing the separation of powers theory:
The men who met in Philadelphia in the summer of 1787 were
practical statesman, experienced in politics, who viewed the principle
of separation of powers as a vital check against tyranny. But they
likewise saw that a hermetic sealing off of the three branches of
Government from one another would preclude the establishment of a
Nation capable of governing itself effectively." 5
131. J. STORY, I COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 528, at 12
(5th ed. 1891).
132. See THE FEDERALIST No. 47, at 337-38 U. Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1961).
133. Id. at 336-38 (emphasis in original).
134. 424 U.S. at 121. The Framers also recognized that blending powers, not rigidly separating
the major branches, would form an effective government. The Constitution in many places requires
explicit cooperation and admixture of functions among the branches. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7,
cl. 2 (presidential veto power over legislation); art. 2, § 2, cl. 2 (Senate consent required for appoint-
ments); art. III, § 2, cl. 2 (congressional regulatory control over Supreme Court appellate
jurisdiction).
135. 424 U.S. at 121.
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The Buckley opinion echoes the observation of Justice Holmes, who wrote
some fifty years earlier that each branch of government "is dependent on
the cooperation of the other two, that government may go on."136
The Supreme Court's recent decisions in Bowsher v. Synarl3" and INS
v. Chadha," 8 however, appear to support a rigid construction of the sepa-
ration of powers. In both cases the Court struck down congressional action
as violative of the doctrine. Each of these cases, though, can be distin-
guished from the FEC situation in that they involved statutes which al-
lowed legislative activity subsequent to passage of the enabling statute. In
Synar, the unconstitutional provision gave a congressional employee, the
Comptroller General, substantial executive power over the budget. " ' In
Chadha, the statute at issue gave Congress power to veto the actions of
the Attorney General.14 0 In neither case did the Court address the consti-
tutionality of an independent agency. " Rather, it struck down Congress's
attempt to give itself or its own employees executive power.
By contrast, Congress gives itself no opportunity for subsequent execu-
tive activity vis-a-vis the FEC, since it lacks the power to remove the
officers of independent agencies. Once an appointment has been made, the
congressional role is finished (except for impeachment). 4 Congress can-
not undo the appointment;" 8 it can only set standards for removal by the
President.
In describing the Framers as "practical statesmen, experienced in polit-
ics,"""' the Supreme Court indicated that in matters involving the separa-
tion of powers, a pragmatic, flexible approach should control. Separation
of powers questions should be resolved "according to common sense and
the inherent necessities of the governmental coordination." 4 5
E. The President's Power of Removal
Although the President has traditionally exercised the power to remove
the officials that he has appointed with the advice and consent of the Sen-
ate, nothing in the Constitution confers upon him the unrestricted power
to do so. Therefore, the removal power cannot act as a constitutional bar
136. Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 120 (1925).
137. 106 S. Ct. 3181 (1986). See Elliott, supra note 13, at 318.
138. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
139. 106 S. Ct. at 3189-92.
140. 462 U.S. at 923.
141. Synar explicitly reserved the question, 106 S. Ct. at 3188 n.4.
142. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 5; art. 11, § 4.
143. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926).
144. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 121.
145. Chadha, 462 U.S. at 962 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting J.W. Hampton
v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928)).
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to the independence of agencies such as the FEC. Writing for the Court
in 1958, Justice Frankfurter observed that the "[clontroversy pertaining to
the scope and limits of the President's power of removal fills a thick chap-
ter of our political and judicial history."" 6 This is due to the Constitu-
tion's silence regarding the controversy. Indeed, the only power of removal
granted by the Constitution is Congress's impeachment power. " " Limita-
tions on the President's power of removal were first suggested by the
Court in Marbury v. Madison," 8 when Chief Justice Marshall stated in
dictum that the President was powerless to withhold the valid commission
of a justice of the peace once an appointment had been made." It was not
until the 1926 decision of Myers v. United States'50-at a time of expan-
sively interpreted presidential powers generally-that the Supreme Court
squarely considered the President's removal power per se and found it to
be quite broad.
Myers involved an order issued by the Postmaster General, acting at the
President's direction, to remove a postmaster. An 1876 statute stated that
postmasters "may be removed by the President by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate. . .. "' The Myers Court not only accepted the
President's argument that this statutory provision was unconstitutional,
but provided him with sweeping powers to remove "executive officers who
had been appointed by him. .... "' The Court found that Congress
could not constitutionally restrain or limit that power. It based its opinion
on Congress's 1789 decision to acquiesce in the President's asserted power
to remove the Secretaries of State, War, and Treasury."' The Court
found the statutory language Congress used in 1789-"whenever the said
principal officer shall be removed from office by the President of the
United States""'-to imply an inherent removal power independent of
congressional approval.
Myers's applicability to officers of independent agencies was sharply
limited only nine years later by Humphrey's Executor v. United States,'"
and further by Wiener v. United States.'56 In Humphrey's Executor, the
146. Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 351 (1958).
147. See supra note 140 and accompanying text.
148. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
149. Id. at 161.
150. 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
151. Id. at 107 (citing 19 Stat. 80, 81 § 6 (1876) (codified as R.S. § 3830 (1876); superseded by
39 U.S.C. § 1001 (1986)),
152. 272 U.S. at 176.
153. Id. at 111-14 (citing I ANNALS OF CONGRESS 370-71, 383, 455, 576, 578-80, 585, and 591
(1789)).
154. Id. at 112. See Act of July 27, 1789, ch. 3, 1 Stat. 28 (1789).
155. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
156. 357 U.S. 349 (1958).
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Court considered whether a provision of the Federal Trade Commission
Act, which stated that "[a]ny commissioner may be removed by the Presi-
dent for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office . . .
unconstitutionally restricted or limited the power of the President to re-
move a commissioner. The Solicitor General claimed that the removal re-
striction constituted an impermissible interference with the.President's Ar-
ticle II powers, and argued that the limitation was "a substantial
interference with the constitutional duty of the President to 'take care that
the laws be faithfully executed.' ""58 He argued that "[f]aithful execution
of the laws may require more than freedom from inefficiency, neglect of
duty, or malfeasance in office." ' 59
In rejecting the Solicitor General's arguments, the Humphrey's Execu-
tor Court sharply distinguished between executive officers in the constitu-
tional sense (that is, purely executive officers) and those performing exec-
utive functions incidental to "the discharge and effectuation of [their]
quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial powers . ,,."" The Court found that
the FTC's power to institute enforcement proceedings was incidental to its
exercise of legislative power, and therefore concluded that the President
could not interfere with its management."' The existing FTC statute
empowered the Commission not only to issue its own administrative com-
plaints, but also to institute judicial proceedings against those who dis-
obeyed cease-and-desist orders.' The Court concluded, however, that the
law enforcement functions of the Commission did not so encroach upon
the President's Article II authority as to render the Commission
unconstitutional. 163
In agreeing that Congress could prevent presidential removal of FTC
Commissioners without cause, the Court emphasized Congress's intent
that commissioners be free from even the possibility of "political domina-
tion or control." 16' The Court found that the statute achieved this objec-
tive. Justice White has since stated that under Humphrey's Executor
"[tihe independent agency . . survived attack [alleging] that its functions
157. 295 U.S. at 160 (citing Federal Trade Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 63-203, 38 Stat. 717
(1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982)).
158. Brief for the United States at 23, Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602
(1935) (No. 667).
159. Id.
160. 295 U.S. at 628.
161. Id. at 629.
162. Id. at 620-21 (citing Federal Trade Commission Act, Pub. L. No. 63-203, 38 Stat. 717
(1914) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982))). The Commission also had the power to
enforce §§ 2, 3, 7, and 8 of the Clayton Act, Pub. L. No. 63-212, 38 Stat. 730, 734 (1914) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 21 (1982)).
163. Id. at 602.
164. Id. at 625.
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are so executive in nature that its members must be subject to Presidential
control. . .. "
Even more significant for FEC independence is Wiener v. United
States,"" in which the Court held that Congress could restrict the Presi-
dent's removal power if the official's functions required freedom from
executive branch interference. In Wiener, President Eisenhower tried to
remove a member of the War Claims Commission. The Court safe-
guarded the independence of the Commission by inferring that the statute,
although silent on removal, barred removal at the pleasure of the Presi-
dent. It understood the Humphrey's Executor decision to draw
a sharp line of cleavage between officials who were part of the Exec-
utive establishment and were thus removable by virtue of the Presi-
dent's constitutional powers, and those who are members of a body
'to exercise its judgment without the leave or hindrance of any other
official or any department of the government'. . . as to whom a power
o removal exists only if Congress may fairly be said to have con-
erred it. This sharp differentiation derives from the difference in
functions between those who are part of the Executive establishment
and those whose tasks require absolute freedom from Executive
interference.16 7
Humphrey's Executor and Wiener show that through statutory protec-
tions, both express and implied, Congress can limit the President's power
to remove the officers of certain regulatory commissions. Both cases stress
the constitutionally valid independent character of the agencies and
emphasize their need to be free from executive interference. Because of its
important role in regulating elections in which the President himself may
have a stake, the FEC requires such protection.
Conclusion
The constitutional justification for Congress's power to create indepen-
dent agencies can be found in Chief Justice Marshall's comments on the
necessary and proper clause in McCulloch v. Maryland: "This provision
is made in a constitution intended to endure for ages to come, and,
165. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 281 (1976) (White, J., concurring in part).
166. 357 U.S. 349 (1957).
167. Id. at 353 (emphasis supplied). With respect to subsequent judicial review, we note that the
Seventh Circuit, relying on Humphrey's Executor and Wiener, summarily rejected a constitutional
challenge to the enforcement powers of the Interstate Commerce Commission. ICC v. Chatworth
Cooperative Marketing Ass'n., 347 F.2d 821, 822 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 938 (1965)
("[T]he function of initiating a judicial proceeding for the enforcement of a legislative enactment is not
the exercise of a prerogative exclusively reserved to the President").
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consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs."""8
The Chief Justice explained that Congress, through the necessary and
proper clause, was free "to exercise its best judgment in the selection of
measures to carry into execution the constitutional powers of govern-
ment" '169 "to avail itself of experience, to exercise its reason, and to accom-
modate its legislation to circumstances." ' Assistant Attorney General
Robert Jackson echoed this view in 1937 when he stated that the Found-
ing Fathers had "set up a living National Government and left the future
to fill in much of the detail, according to its own experience, its judgment
and its own patriotic purposes." '71
We would argue that the words "necessary and proper" do not mean
"required and authorized" but only "reasonable and relevant." It is rea-
sonable and relevant that certain investigations and prosecutions be con-
ducted without presidential involvement or supervision, for even the most
high-minded and able may be unduly deferential to higher authority, and
nothing is more intimidating to officers of the United States than the
authority of the President. The list of officers of the United States pro-
tected from removal at the President's will is a long one.17 1 Congress has
found it necessary to create commissions that are free to act as the facts
and their own judgment require.
This Article has argued that at least one independent agency, the FEC,
is constitutional under the necessary and proper clause. The Article there-
fore undermines blanket attacks on the constitutionality of independent
agencies in general. Courts reviewing the constitutionality of independent
agencies must examine how legislation has situated each agency within
the constitutional scheme. Judicial deference to Congress's broad and
important powers under the necessary and proper clause must be the pre-
requisite to such an examination.
168. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819) (emphasis in original).
169. Id. at 420.
170. Id. at 415-16.
171. Address by Robert H. Jackson, Assistant Attorney General of the United States, before the
New York Bar Association (Jan. 29, 1937), reprinted in 81 CONG. REc. 123, 124 (1937)
(Appendix).
172. Prof. Kenneth Culp Davis in 1976 counted 63 independent agencies protected against the
presidential removal power. K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES 14 (1976).
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